Towards Barcelona 2018: The Ordinary Psychoses and the Others, Under Transference

Disorders, Symptoms and Discreet Signs

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Disorders, Symptoms and Discreet Signs

Massimo Termini

We are familiar with the statement “a disturbance that occurs at the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life”\(^1\). It is used by Lacan in *On a question prior to any possible treatment of psychosis* to indicate the fundamental repercussion in subjective experience of the disorganisation that the Other undergoes as a result of foreclosure. In this way, a feature recurring throughout the vast field of psychosis is isolated. It is thus that, as J.-A. Miller indicates, we will not fail to find it in ordinary psychosis.

In this respect, three distinct externalities are brought to light in *Ordinary Psychosis Revisited*\(^2\), as registers of experience in which this disorder is expressed.

In the first place, we have a social externality that concerns the identifications that allow the subject to occupy a position, carry out a function, a role. These identifications can be present with a negative aspect (too precarious) or a positive aspect (too intense). Secondly, a bodily externality that concerns the relationship with “the body as Other for the subject”\(^3\), characterised by a profound “discordance”.

Thirdly, a subjective externality that is located above all in the “experience […] of void, of emptiness and vagueness”\(^4\), as well as at the level of the identification with the object a as waste – both marked by a particular fixity.

This is the starting point from which we can investigate the symptoms and discreet signs that distinguish the disorder of ordinary psychosis both from the more evident disorder of the other psychoses and from the disorder that is present in a different way in neurosis.
For example, with regard to the first externality, how can “negative social identification” in ordinary psychosis be distinguished from the hysterical rebellion against the master signifier or the isolation of the obsessional? Alternatively, in which features are we to recognise the particular intensity that social identification can take on in these cases of psychosis? And what relationship is there between this identificatory framework and the “external imitation” of the so-called “as if” personality?

Moving on to the second externality, a clinical challenge of particular interest can lie in being able to delimit the bodily discordance in ordinary psychosis. It is not as manifest as in a forthright schizophrenia, and yet goes beyond the strangeness testified to in neurosis, especially hysteria.

A separate place is accorded to sexuality, however, given that “a typical sex life does not exist”. What can be said about this?

Looking at the third externality, what is the sign of a particular fixity in the experience of the void or in the relation to the waste object such as to suggest psychosis? And what instead is the sign of a dialectical dimension of an order that is more properly neurotic? Other aspects are also indicated by J.-A. Miller, such as the relationship with ideas – still to be developed – and the relationship with language. “Subtle plumb lines of meaning in the slippage of signification, veiled phenomena of allusion” – these are two examples of disturbances of language. Others can also be taken into consideration.

Lastly, we can still ask whether there are any other registers of experience to be taken into account – other symptoms and other minimal, discreet signs that suggest a disorder that touches on and disrupts the juncture that engages the subject with the sense of life? These are the themes and questions that we put to our colleagues, in order to further our understanding of ordinary psychosis. Their responses were readily forthcoming, with some of the points being addressed in greater depth than others.

Focusing on the thesis of generalised foreclosure formulated by J.-A. Miller, the text by D. Laurent provides an apt point of departure for our research. As Laurent emphasises, this proposition drawn from Lacan’s last teaching subverts rather than abolishes the classical psychiatric categories and, at the same time, opens up a space for the notion of ordinary psychosis. In this way, its innovative scope is highlighted. The discreet signs of ordinary psychosis, which remain hidden from the clinic of the gaze and evade classifications, find a response in a psychoanalytic approach characterised by “a particular attention to saying”, where the analyst must become “the partner of this discreet symptomatisation of the subject”.

The contribution by N. Purgato looks instead at the social dimension of work. Using the biblical story of creation as a springboard, in which work is “considered to be essentially constitutive of man”, this brief conceptual trajectory leads to the clinic. Having posed the
difference, of undoubted interest, between the function that work can have in obsessional neurosis as opposed to ordinary psychosis, attention is focused on the latter. By way of two brief clinical vignettes a point is isolated, namely that in some cases work can be pivotal to existence, allowing the subject to "keep going" and to feel that they have a place in the community.

Moving on, we encounter the theme of the body, which is the most prominent theme in this second edition of the Papers, with three contributions exploring this area in particular. In the first of texts, the Lacanian expression of the "sense of life" is examined. Through an effective theoretical itinerary, S. Castellanos analyses this notion in the context of the three registers of the imaginary, symbolic and real. Concentrating on the real, the body, a living body that enjoys, the body one has and which speaks becomes "the carrier of the sense of life". The pragmatics of the clinic of psychosis is stated as that which, when faced with a body that tends towards decomposition, makes room for the subject's solutions in order to provide unity, thus attaching the body and making it one's own.

The guiding theme in the third contribution dedicated to the body – and also to sexuality – is the Lacanian formula "always badly situated". C. Iddan concentrates on the relationship between the externality of the body, as Other of the subject, and the Freudian notion of refusal of femininity, as Other of sex. Even though they are present in every speaking being, these two aspects are clearly revealed in psychosis. They appear in various guises and are illustrated in this text by means of two clinical examples, where a comparison is made between two cases of "in-discreet" psychosis that will surely be of interest to readers.

Sexuality is also a theme in the text by R. Ferreira da Silva, focusing on the relationship between ordinary psychosis and neurosis, in respect of which Lacan's last teaching calls on us to "reposition ourselves". Having highlighted the notion of "phallic rupture" as the key to interpreting modern symptoms located on this side of the clinic, an effective distinction is made between the "madness" present in the realm of sex life, presenting as "adaptations" of this rupture, and those symptoms that reveal themselves instead as an expression of a disorder that relates to the inmost juncture of the sense of life.

Concluding the series of texts, the contribution by C.-M. Holguín reflects on the signs revealing a disturbance of jouissance at the level of the letter and writing, to be taken as "signs of the ordinary".
A brief and incisive overview leads to an insightful understanding of the localisation of these signs in the three Lacanian registers – in the imaginary, with images related to the body and the mental; in the symbolic, with phenomena that attest to the different ways of making a name for oneself by means of an $S_1$; and in the real, with the different forms of identification with the object $a$.

3 Ibid., p. 43.
4 Ibid., p. 44.
5 Ibid., p. 42.
The New Norms and the Ordinary of Psychosis

Dominique Laurent – ECF

The opposition between the normal and the pathological was subverted by psychoanalysis. For a long time it was believed that we could avoid this subversion either by considering that certain types of symptoms were only slightly removed from the norm, neurosis being thus almost the norm, or on the contrary by radically distinguishing these symptoms from the norm, thus classifying them within the framework of the psychosis.

The norm was not put into question since it seemed to be constructed on the basis of the law of the father. Yet the norm is not the law, as Michel Foucault has pointed out. The symbolic law does not cover the field of norms. We speak about norms in the plural. They proliferate, they multiply. We speak about the law in the singular. For Lacan, the law can be reduced to the commandments of speech according to the Decalogue. Social norms are also those that are embodied in a lifestyle. It could be said that a lifestyle is the style of the conflict between civilization and the way the drive is lived. The prevailing norms (those of the majority) acknowledge their minorities, their fringes. In this sense, the quasi-norm of neurosis is not the only one. Moreover, is it still the norm? This is a true question. Neurosis coexists with the lifestyle of sexual minorities, the lifestyle of new modes of parenting, the lifestyle of heterosexuals in couples or single, with a family or not. Neurotic guilt coexists with the decision and the rigor of psychosis, but also with the turmoil and anxieties of those who are not exactly inscribed within either one or the other. These norms are in competition in the market of lifestyles. The social value attached to one or the other varies according to the price granted by civilization to the Ideal and to the object a.

Lacan broke the relations between neurosis as quasi-norm and the law. He showed how the fossilized categories of the psychiatric clinic, already tightened up by Freud for use in psychoanalysis, are general regroupings which allow the singularity of the symptom of each one to be ignored. These categories engender norms. In this regard, Lacan spoke of the homosexual norm; he has also said that “paranoid psychosis and personality (…) are
the same thing”1; and even that the social bond has a psychotic foundation since: “interpretative delusion is above all a delusion of the hallway, the forum, the street”.2

The thesis of generalized foreclosure was formulated by Jacques-Alain Miller in 1985 in his DEA seminar dedicated to the study of the Freudian case of “The Wolf Man”, which was discussed in depth at a nosographic level. This thesis means “everyone is delusional”. In 1978, Lacan thus writes that for Freud “everything is but a dream, and that everyone (if one can say such a thing), that everyone is mad, that is, delusional”.3 It is on this basis that we can deduce “a universal clinic of delusion, which is based on the premise that all our discourses are nothing but defenses against the real”.4 Generalized foreclosure does not abolish psychopathological classifications, it rather subverts them. It points out the fact that the real of jouissance is never completely reabsorbed by the mortification of the signifier, and that in this respect the paternal metaphor is never fully realised.5

In his late teaching, Lacan highlights the impact of saying [dire] on the body prior to any implication of the gaze in the mirror stage. This impact on the body accounts for the troumatisme6, the border that joins the body and the site of language. The troumatisme can also be qualified as generalized hallucination in the sense that the body perceives language as making a hole through its impact of jouissance. In this sense troumatisme is correlative to a new definition of the symptom. It is no longer the symptom as metaphor, as meaning effect, but as a body event, an emergence of jouissance, as sinthome.

The sinthome assures an articulation between a signifying operation and jouissance. If castration anxiety is the moment where jouissance and anxiety take on genital signification, what is at stake in the perspective of the sinthome is not the creation of new clinical categories but the search for the singularity of the distribution of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary in each case.

With the concept of the sinthome and of the paternal metaphor as primary apparatus of the symptom, we can deduce that the delusional metaphor, as well as the identification which supports the psychotic subject before the triggering, are both non-standard versions of the Name of the Father.

With the notion of ordinary psychosis introduced by J.-A. Miller7, we have a supple clinic [une clinique du roseau]. It allows us to observe the way in which an investment of meaning, of enjoy-meant, carried by a signifier counts as a neo-Name of the Father, a neo-phallus, preventing the cataclysm of triggering. Psychoanalysis allows these subjects, in moments of eruption of the real, to invent non-standard procedures to give a meaning and to fixate the various drive circuits, in other words, jouissance, which are not unified by castration. It allows the diffraction of the jouissance that cannot be negativised with which they are confronted in the form of various objects a. The modalities of apparatus of jouissance must be distinguished from the singular invention which functions as desire. The fragmentation of the current psychiatric clinic leads in the direction of research into infra-clinical signs, prior to any observable disorder, following the medical model of can-
cer. Our clinic distances itself from this research into organic processes but it is not a clinic of the gaze either. We are interested in the discreet sign that escapes the clinic of the gaze, requiring that a particular attention be paid to the saying [dire]. These discreet signs may appear in childhood. They do not speak “like an open sky” and escape all classifications. It is a question of taking them into account in order to define a new psychoanalytic approach of ordinary psychosis. In other words, it is a question of making oneself the partner of this discreet symptomatization of the subject. There are subjects for whom the world is not ordered by the Name of the Father. Yet they are not characterised by the Freudian Unglauben, by the radical disbelief in any master signifier, in the whole swarm of Names of the Father. The classic psychiatric clinic already distinguished partial delusions, hysterical madness, pseudo-neurotic schizophrenia, etc. There is however a significant range of cases that are not included in any of these previous attempts at classification, while nevertheless having nothing to do with the sinthome as operator, as generalized Name of the Father.

In this perspective, the analytic experience reveals that the discourse of the neurotic subject to defend himself against the real is no longer the norm in the contemporary world, even if there are still fathers and mothers, on to which discourse hooks itself, in multiple versions.

*Translated by Despina Andropoulou*

6 [TN] Condensation of trou [hole] and traumatisme [trauma].
The Blessing of Work

Nicola Purgato – SLP

Among the three forms of disturbance that J.-A. Miller invites us to identify through the very small clues in ordinary psychosis, the first relates to a disturbance “in the way you feel the surrounding world”. Considering that “very often it’s a question of intensity (...) a question of more or less”\(^2\), the nuances are multiple and are situated between a subject who “is unable to conquer a place in the sun, is unable to assume a social function”\(^3\) and a subject who instead is excessively invested in their social position or in their work.

It is on these nuances concerning the theme of work – which are often situated in between these rather clear-cut and easily discernible positions – that I would like to focus, albeit in a time when the persistence of the economic crisis means that work is a frequent subject of complaint.

The vocation of work

If we turn to the myth of the creation of the world that structures Western civilisation, even before the appearance of human beings God speaks of the task that will be reserved for them\(^4\). This task involves dominating the earth and the animals, much as God did by transforming chaos into an ordered world. The biblical text suggests that human beings are co-creators, participating with their efforts in the divine work.

This task also has a prominent position in the second story of the creation, so much so that when the narrator mentions human beings, who have not yet been created, they are associated with work: “There was no man to work the ground”\(^5\). Human beings are part of the ground, but at the same time they have the task of cultivating it. This is highlighted in the play on words “‘adam[...] min ha’adamā”, “umano tratto dall’humus”, translated in English as “man of dust from the ground”.

In the story of the creation, work is considered to be essentially constitutive of man. A life without work cannot be fulfilled, successful and worthy of man. Following the punishment due to original sin, work retains all its value, but is transformed by being associated with toil and sweat:
Cursed is the ground because of you; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken.6

Freud states that “No other technique for the conduct of life attaches the individual so firmly to reality as laying emphasis on work; for his work at least gives him a secure place in a portion of reality, in the human community. The possibility it offers of displacing a large amount of libidinal components, whether narcissistic, aggressive or even erotic, on to professional work and on to the human relations connected with it lends it a value by no means second to what it enjoys as something indispensable to the preservation and justification of existence in society. […] And yet, as a path to happiness, work is not highly prized by men”7.

An S1 that makes a bond

It is nonetheless not unusual to find subjects who – beyond their socio-economic background, their affective life or their actual income – experience work as the only identification that links them, as Freud said, to reality and the human community. From this point of view, it appears that work enjoys a particular privilege: while presenting itself as an S1 all alone, it has the capacity of making a bond (often imaginary) with the Other, given that since the beginning of time work has been the task assigned by the Other and for others, as the biblical narrator explains in the myth of the creation.

We also find that the dimension of work is central in obsessional neurosis, where it is characterised by inhibition or so-called “oblativity”. In the latter case, everything the subject does is never for himself but always in response to the demand of the Other, by whom the subject must have himself demanded or, at the very least, have himself authorised. As Lacan reminds us, this is the typical defence against the desire of the Other: “To cover over the desire of the Other, the obsessional has one path, and that is his recourse to demand”8. The Other, with its demand, is thus in the foreground in obsessional neurosis, where in order to realise himself the subject must rely on the narcissistic support that can be provided by the image of the Other’s presumed self-mastery. This involves a certain fascination with perfection and the fact that “the Ego-Ideal takes the form of the Almighty”9, even if being everything for the Other produces in the subject a sense of solitude or non-life. In ordinary psychosis, we do not witness any of this intense activity around the demand and the desire of the Other. All of this is produced around the S1 of work itself, allowing the subject the “sentiment” of having some sort of place in the world.

Giuseppe, a fifty-year-old single man who for many years has been working part-time in a public organisation, is proud of his job “even though he earns a pittance”. He feels like he is the only one to be working diligently to keep the organisation going, as all of his colleagues are idlers, spending their time talking and disparaging him. There are no signs
of manifest psychosis, even though an underlying psychotic structure can be discerned,
as Miller suggests we do in order not to take refuge in an “asile de l’ignorance”\(^{10}\). But in
his case, even though it isolates him from the others, work provides him with a sense of
having some sort of bond with the Other.

Luigi, a young unemployed man, spends his days studying economics in order to discover
the tricks and ploys used by politicians and economists to keep us in a state of crisis so
that we can be held to ransom. It is not a real job and he earns nothing. From time to time
he writes short articles for a local newspaper. Yet he believes this to be the work required
to keep citizens on their toes and to contribute to improving the world. In this case too,
the signifier of work alone is enough to keep him going and to feel like he has a place in
the community.

These individuals manage to lead a fairly “normal” life solely by virtue of the signifier “work”,
which supports them and allows them to keep going even when it takes on an unusual
or somewhat modest form. For these individuals, work and toil are a blessing rather than
the result of a mythical curse. It is work alone that allows them to feel like they are contrib-
uting to the task of looking after and cultivating the world, while bringing some sort of
order to their own inner world.

*Translated by Carlo Zuccarini*

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p.42.
4 Cf., Genesis 1, 26.
5 Genesis 2, 5.
Freud contributed in a decisive way to the understanding of psychosis but not to its treatment. At the same time, he made an attempt to clarify, from the point of view of structure, the difference between neurosis and psychosis and to isolate the specificity of a psychotic mechanism, but without managing to do so. He made reference to a modality of radical defence against intolerable representations, using the term Verwerfung, which Lacan would retrieve, translating it as foreclosure.

This will be a fundamental reference for Lacan in Seminar III and for the elaboration of his theory of psychosis as it took shape in the course of his teaching. In the text “On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis”, where he considers Schreber’s psychosis, he writes the well-known phrase: “It is clear that what we are presented with here is a disturbance that occurred at the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life.”

We can analyze this expression “sense of life” from the perspective of the registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real.

1. In the first period of his teaching, which Lacan calls “antecedents”, he considers that a living organism plus an image are needed to make a body, and attributes the sense of the unity of the body to the unity of the image. In Lacan’s initial presentation of the mirror stage, the total corporal image with which the subject identifies has the value of life. For Lacan, who at that point finds his inspiration in the ethology of the animal world, the image as imaginary matrix embodies the vital force that will subsequently become the subject.

The infans suffers the experience of a fragmented body, of a body he cannot master. At the same time, it is thanks to the imaginary and symbolic identifications that the other offers him that he can establish a relationship between the organism, the fragmented body and the reality or the perception of the body’s unity.

This means that the subject experiences himself as “I” in the place of the other. The image is his yet at the same time it is that of the other because he is in deficit with respect to it. That is how the matrix of the imaginary is inscribed. This will also explain the relation of
imaginary aggressiveness with the counterpart, this ambivalent aggressiveness, because
the counterpart is always someone who takes his place, who supplants him. At the begin-
nning of life, the constitution of the psyche in its imaginary dimension — even though we
should not overlook the incidence of language that precedes us — is an unstable, sha-
dowy world without consistency. For Lacan we are from the start involved in the paranoid
dimension of the constitution of the personality and the experience of the fragmented
body.

2. This formulation will subsequently be modified in his text “On a Question Prior… “ intro-
ducing the idea that the human animal imagines its own death: “Indeed, it is by means
of the gap in the imaginary opened up by this prematurity, and in which the effects of
the mirror stage proliferate, that the human animal is capable of imagining himself mor-
tal – which does not mean that he could do so without his symbiosis with the symbolic,
but rather that, without the gap that alienates him from his own image, this symbiosis
with the symbolic, in which he constitutes himself as subject to death, could not have
occurred.”

Lacan attributes to the signifier of the Name of the Father the role of furnishing a sense of
security and of being alive. This will have consequences in his elaborations on psychosis,
where it is the foreclosure of the Name of the Father, with the incidence this has on the
imaginary order, that will introduce the psychotic phenomena affecting the body. The
symbolic order institutes and stabilizes for the subject a relationship with the “sense of
life” that will allow a relationship to the world oriented by phallic signification, making
possible his inscription in discourse and the establishment of the social bond.

If the Name of the Father is not operative the body in psychosis is permanently threate-
ned with fragmentation, it cannot hold together. We find in Schreber’s “Memoirs…” all
the phenomena related to the dissolution of the imaginary and can read how his body
at certain moments had been threatened, damaged, altered, destroyed or mutilated. The
terrain of this struggle played out with his persecutors (Dr Flechsig, God …) is thus his
own body.

3. In the final period of his teaching, Lacan speaks of the parlêtre not as being a body but
as having a body. There is a gap between being and having a body because the encounter
with language supposes a loss of naturalness that is constitutive of the human being. In
any case, the reintegration of language in the body is not assured beforehand. We could
say that it does not operate in psychosis.

This change of perspective supposes that in order for there to be jouissance and the “sense
of life” the body is necessary, the living body. A body that speaks and enjoys: “a body is
something that enjoys itself” (cela se jouit) and the speaking being speaks with what he
has, that is, his own body. The body thus becomes the carrier of the “sense of life”. And this
is how “the body phenomena” that characterize psychosis can be clinically observed in an evident manner in the case of the triggered psychosis.

The psychotic has to make immense efforts of invention to keep the body together as ‘one’. The response of the subject, be it through delusion or through other solutions or imaginary identifications, attempts to recompose his own world, and also the body as something that belongs to him.

In my clinical experience it is very frequent to come across untriggered psychoses in which we can find certain indications that, as in Clérambault’s Small Mental Automatism, will orient us in the diagnosis of ordinary psychosis. The experience of the initial phenomena of the Small Mental Automatism with their intrusive and foreign character, preceding or not other Elemental Phenomena, give as a clue in elucidating the pragmatics of the clinic of ordinary psychosis.

As J.-A. Miller points out: “The inmost disturbance is a gap where the body is un-wedged, where the subject needs some tricks to re-appropriate his own body, where the subject is led to invent some artificial bond to re-appropriate his body, to tie his body to itself. To cast it in medical terminology, he needs a joint-brace to connect with the body.”

There is a great variety of solutions that we come across in the clinic. That of the patient who could make a body for himself via the “uniform” of the “State Security Corps” that provided him with a minimum framework, even though fragile and imaginary; or those who find in writing a solution to avoid the shattering and fragmentation of the imaginary body; or those who in their low intensity paranoid delusion find a form of social bond that sustains them.

These bracings, stitching, or solutions — whatever we call them — take on the function of tying the three registers together: the imaginary of the body, the symbolic, and the real, as the effects that jouissance has in the body as enjoying substance.

The pragmatics of the clinic will occupy an important place in the bricolage that comes in the place of a discourse in which the subject, although he is in language, has not been able to include himself. This is the fine texture with which we weave a clinic under transference.

Translated by Amalia Rodríguez Monroy

Disturbances of the Body: A Chromatic Clinic

Eugenia Molina – eol

There was one part of Tsukuru’s body that was extremely sensitive, somewhere along his back. This soft, subtle spot he couldn’t reach was usually covered by something, so that it was invisible to the naked eye. But when, for whatever reason, that spot became exposed and someone’s finger pressed down on it, something inside him would stir. A special substance would be secreted, swiftly carried by his bloodstream to every corner of his body. That special stimulus was both a physical sensation and a mental one, creating vivid images in his mind. The first time he met Sara, he felt an anonymous finger reach out and push down forcefully on that trigger on his back.1

Tsukuru is a young man obsessed by not knowing the colour that corresponds to his name. After years of pilgrimage he discovers that his colour is grey. He is not outstanding at anything in particular in his life. He has progressed from year to year at school, taking part in the sports that the others play and thinking, perhaps a little bit too much, about death.

A grey character with a special sensitivity in a part of his body, a specific detail that can go unnoticed, but which takes on a special value in relation to a woman.

What is it that we call disorder?

We could begin with the notion of order. In Lacan’s first teaching it is the symbolic that is conceived of as an order. The symbolic order, along with the Name of the Father, is what gives stability and firmness to an imaginary that is shifting and unstable, appearing as the beginning of psychical life.

When Lacan talks about a “a disturbance [désordre] that occurs at the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life”, he does so in context of his first teaching, explaining how “soul murder” – the delusion constructed by President Schreber – testifies to foreclosure, the
presence of a hole at a point where there is no metaphoric operation and thus no phallic signification.

As we move on to Lacan’s late teaching, there is no prevalence of an order or register; R.S.I are rather equivalent, they mimic one other⁴. In this late teaching, singular inventions become important at the moment of creating a nomination that would be valid for life, beyond the Name of the Father.

In the field of the ordinary psychoses, this disorder could be considered a disturbance⁵. It is not a lack of order that commands, but rather a maladjustment, a kind of disruption of the subject in relation to his world, his body or his ideas, a disruption that can have diffuse or rigidly defined borders.

In those cases that involve neither a clear neurosis nor a triggered psychosis, in this clinic where we do not find a relation to the Name of the Father, where neither the family romance nor the relation of the subject to minus phi is evoked, faced with subjects where these relations cannot be elicited, the analyst encounters certain details, elements that have a certain particularity or strangeness, without being something that catches the attention of the social Other.

**Externalities**

In order to better grasp what is at stake in the disturbance that occurs at the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life in the ordinary psychoses, J.-A. Miller introduces us to three externalities: social, bodily and subjective⁶.

Externality is a term used in the field of economics to refer to a maladjustment or a distortion between the costs of production and/or consumption of an item and its price in the market⁷.

It is interesting to consider why J.-A. Miller used a term that in economics refers to a maladjustment, to something that is not proportionately aligned with the source of its production. On this point we could draw an analogy with the disproportion between the efforts of someone attempting to make something more congenial of his world, his body or his ideas, and the effect that these manoeuvres have if they succeed in granting the subject a place, a name, or making his life more liveable.

Although the neurotic subject also struggles to find the right balance in life, for the psychotic the work needed to achieve a possible adjustment involves too much effort and is often impossible without the recourse of analysis.

**The invention made to measure is different from fabrication⁸**

How does the parlêtre come to terms with its body? What does it make use of in order to establish a relation with its body? What are we analysts to do with the fragile or stable solutions that someone brings to our practice?
If we speak of singular arrangements it is because there are disarrangements that one has to work with. I am especially interested in the disarrangement that a subject can experience in his or her body, to the degree that they do not have one, do not possess a body like a commodity, like a piece of furniture. Even in ordinary psychosis where the terrain of precisions becomes unstable, the relation with the body is one of the signs that can orient us in situating something of the disturbance at the inmost juncture of the sense of life. Subjects that suffer from strange symptoms in their bodies that have no medical explanation and do not obey the mechanisms of conversion; bodies with surfaces almost completely covered in tattoos like the signs of the writing of a history that cannot be transmitted by words; men and women that defy the passage of time at whatever the cost by means of surgery and treatments; particular interpretations of what goes into and comes out of the body, at the root of diets that organize a way of life; rigid ways of protecting the body, or on the contrary, forms of exposure that always flirt with risk; subjects that go unnoticed, like Tsukuru, without making a sign to the other.

Details marked by a tendency to the infinite and excessive, which do not escape the hearing or the gaze of the analyst, who localizes in these details that which the subject cannot: its jouissance. It is a clinic that is impious for those who do not have the subtlety to catch hold of these discreet reliefs that indicate modes of knotting other than the Name of the Father. At the same time, it is a clinic that demands precision and rigor in the disquisition between the fields of neurosis and psychosis.

The relation with one’s own body is always alien, enigmatic. It is the mark that the parlêtre carries because there is no normal relation with the body due to the trauma of lalangue which affects each one of us with a singular touch. In hysteria, it is rebellion and the relation to desire that delineates these deviations, while in obsession it is the relation to demand. Yet, one of the signs that give us a clue that we are in the terrain of psychosis, when it is not an extraordinary psychosis, is the great effort that someone makes to find a viable use for his or her body. These inventions made to measure are different from the ready-to-wear inventions of the neurotic.

I propose we think the tendency to the infinite and the excessive as traces of these signs that could be mistaken for characteristics of neurosis, but which, under a more attentive gaze, testify to a disarray of the subject with a body not limited by the minus phi. These bodies, tattooed and pierced, with unusual localisations, strange meanings, or the presence of special inventions that attempt to isolate or subject the body, demand a gaze of subtlety from the analyst. How can we approach these small inventions to extract from them a better adjustment with jouissance?

A clinic of tonality is what J.-A. Miller proposes, which implies not only detecting these discreet signs camouflaged in the greys of neurosis, but also finding a way out of the babbling of the Name of the Father in order to specify, say, formalize how we operate in this chromatic clinic that the ordinary psychoses introduce us to.

Translated by Alejandro Betancur
1 Murakami H., Colorless Tsukuru Tazakin and His Years of Pilgrimage, transl. P. Gabriel, Knopf, 2014.
6 Ibid., p. 42.
Externality: Being “always badly situated”

Claudia Iddan – NLS

In “Ordinary Psychosis Revisited”, J.-A. Miller highlights externality as a sign “of a disturbance at the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life”.

However, this complexity can manifest itself in all speaking beings, since externality denotes a particular mode of relation, an estrangement between the subject and the Other.

In RSI³ Lacan formulates that every speaking being is always badly situated between two and three dimensions – the dit-mensions in question being the three rings on which the said rests: the imaginary, the symbolic and the real. But what does “badly situated” mean, and above all “always badly situated”? It seems to me that the expression has to do with our positioning with regard to the relationship between the body, thought, and jouissance. In this way, the central point of the bad situation, or externality, of the speaking being finds an echo in the formulation of our exile, our forced exile, we could say, from the sexual relation. It is an exile that introduces into psychic life the experience of externality linked to the concept of generalised foreclosure.

The body is the Other of the subject. Access to a unified form of his body takes place first of all by means of an external image. The subject is captivated by this privileged image, which he turns back onto his world, “his Umwelt, what there is around him, he corpo-reifies it, he makes it a thing in the image of his body”⁴. If man did not have a body, says Lacan, not only would he not be able to think, as the greatest part of his thinking is rooted in the body, but he would also no longer be captivated by the image of his body, which he projects onto his surroundings. This means that the fact of appropriating for himself a body, especially since he is not a body but he has one, is the basis of the thinking that constitutes the gluing of the imaginary and the fascination the speaking being experiences in relation to his own image.

This appropriation, this dance with the world, implants the sense of life in the speaking being. Thus, at the moment where a disturbance is produced at the level of the capti-
vation of the image, and of the corpo-reification of the world, the speaking being finds itself crushed in the face of the radicality of the Other, in the face of its sexual reality. The subject is thus confronted with the impossibility of giving consistence to his body, and is obliged to look for ways to attach himself and to treat this strangeness. If one also takes into account the Freudian idea of the Ablehnung [refusal, repudiation] of femininity as the correct description of a common and notable point of psychic life of each human being, one can then ask whether there is a relation between the externality of the body as radical separation from the Other and the repudiation of femininity as repudiation of the Other of sex. It seems to me, in any case, that this repudiation refers the speaking being back to the question of “enigmatized coitus”, as J.-A. Miller defines it, referring to the always present mystery of sex.5

“In-discrete” psychosis is similarly liable to reveal more clearly the externality at the level of the body. I will illustrate this point by way of two examples. It concerns a young man who I will call the “Inverse Man”. He presents schizophrenic phenomena: sometimes he feels that his head is detached from his body, or that his anus and his penis contract, mainly at the moment where he has to express himself. At those moments he is invaded by great anxiety, and he ends up asking himself about the function of this organ – Lacan dixit – that language is.6 An aspect of externality of his body is manifested in the image of himself as a child – imagination or hallucination? – that he sees before him. He is in fact this child possessed by the mother’s gaze. The question he constantly comes back to is in relation to femininity, how to interpret the difference between the sexes and what can explain “that a woman can wish to be penetrated”? He does not accept feminine castration, and because of this he associates coitus with a violent act, on the one hand, and on the other hand, with a union of bodies that effaces difference.

This speaking being never stops complaining about the fact that the others know something he doesn’t, which illustrates another aspect of externality of his body, but in the form of a “not knowing” which maintains the repudiation of femininity. Despite this idea, he constructs his own sexual theory: an “inverted sexuality” which highlights the place of the contraction of the penis as his version of a “push to the woman”.

The second example is the Wolf Man, a limit case, thus unclassifiable. Freud names the particular way in which the subject refuses castration as Verwerfung. In fact, he wants to know nothing about it. The lack of difference between the sexes is resolved through the image of the “front buttocks”. One does not find phenomena of bodily fragmentation. The conquest of masculinity is produced by the relation that exists between a violent breakthrough to the woman – Durchbruch zum Weib – and the symbolic identification with the father that touches on his “ego”. At the same time there is an identification at the imaginary level with the mother, with the woman. These two identifications grasped by Lacan have a relation with two crucial moments of his history: the identification with the mother in the primal scene, and following this, the scene with Grouscha. The experience
of the veil that separates him from the world translates his version of the externality of the body, which in my opinion is rooted in this radical opposition between the two major identifications. It is only the act of defecation that allows him to tear the veil and to appropriate a bodily unity for himself. The repeated enemas administered by another represent at the same time the act of coupling and of giving birth.

In the two cases, the externality takes shape in different ways. In the case of the Inverse Man it is translated by the absence of the Name of the Father and a relation to the enigmatic body that is characterised by the fact that language has not taken root in the body, which becomes fragmented, insensitive and almost without organs. In the case of the Wolf Man, it is rather the elision of the phallus, as the externalisation symbolised by the veil, that separates him from the world, as well as the radical cut between the subject and the ego in two opposing identifications. The Other of the body is also the Other of sex in relation to the repudiation of femininity and the mystery of sex. With the Inverse Man, despite his strong attraction to women, there is a rejection of their castration and what is foreclosed returns to the body through the contraction of the anus, and in particular his penis, as an invagination. The act of masturbation awakens in him the sense of bisexuality. In the case of the Wolf Man, the repudiation takes the shape of a violent breakthrough to the woman, as a path of access to masculinity, while for him femininity returns through the intestinal disturbances – an identification with his mother – and the construction of an anal sexual theory, which is incarnated in the enemas. In the end, faced with the body and sexual reality, the psychotic shares the destiny of all speaking beings, being always “badly situated”.

Translated by Natalie Wülffing

The Ordinary Psychoses and the Others

Rômulo Ferreira da Silva – EBP

The emergence of the expression *ordinary psychosis* put us to work over two decades. We are now taking up the concept again from other perspectives. We were able to verify that the idea of severe illnesses that present in a discreet manner was already present in classical psychiatry. Here I highlight the work of Eugen Bleuler, who gave value in the diagnosis of psychosis to alterations in affectivity, in the association of ideas, in ambivalence and autism as symptoms. It was a question of a gradation in the intensity of these symptoms, but within the distinction between neurosis and psychosis. In other authors, such as Gatin De Clérambault, Ernest Kretschmer or Klaus Conrad, for example, the intensity of symptoms in the great chapter of psychosis also highlighted the possibility that a psychosis could take a silent form.

We could, in the same way, revisit the work of Freud, in the case of the Wolf Man, and that of Lacan, in his elaboration of the motives that led to the triggering of Schreber’s psychosis at the age of 52. Before then, his psychosis presented itself as ordinary.

Given the deserved attention that has been paid to this theme as a field of research, Graciela Brodsky proposes that we “do not superimpose the new elements of Lacan’s late teaching on the classic elements, rather maintaining the idea that the late teaching seeks to resolve problems that had not previously been confronted.” Following this orientation, we take our distance from the idea that ordinary psychosis is simply a discreet psychosis. The triggering becomes secondary and what orients us is “a new paradigm that develops two aspects: on the one hand, ‘there is no sexual relation’ and on the other hand, ‘there is something of the One’; that which isn’t and that which is.” With this in mind, the concept of ordinary psychosis becomes a tool for clarifying the development of Lacan’s teachings. In his text “Ordinary Psychosis Revisited”, Jacques-Alain Miller states that he intends to speak about the concept of ordinary psychosis “as a further feedback from many years of using this category with my colleagues, many of whom have contributed to giving a more definite shape to this concept.”
The research carried out has influenced our practice with the extraordinary psychoses, from which we have been able to extract important consequences. One of these can be verified on the basis of what Éric Laurent tells us about the position of secretary of the insane. This involves a more active position which grants privilege, in the subject’s discourse, to one signifier rather than another. Directing the treatment in this way can give rise to an inflection in the construction of the delusion, so that a psychosis comes to blend with the landscape without arriving at the extreme of the passage to the act. It is a way of making possible a symptomatic knotting that keeps real, symbolic and imaginary together.

Miller presents three externalities in relation to the sense of life: the social, the bodily, and the subjective externality. He doesn’t discuss sex life, thus leaving a chapter to be explored. He says that “there is no typical sexual life. You all could make a list of certain strange experiences in sexual life… just look for a disturbance in the most intimate juncture of the sexual act, and generally you will find it.”

Jésus Santiago tells us that with the clinic of ‘the compensatory make-believe’ of the ordinary psychoses “one gives value to the continuity between the fields of neurosis and psychosis, stressing that which makes them contiguous, like two modes of responding to the same real, given that, from this point of view, it is not a question of establishing borders but rather of establishing knottings, fastenings, disconnections, and detachments between threads that are in continuity.”

These are precious orientations with respect to our approach to sexual plurality in the contemporary era and the possible signs of an ordinary psychosis. When Lacan wrote in 1978 that “everyone is mad,” “everyone is delusional in their own way,” he instigates the necessity of repositioning ourselves in the face of neuroses.

Brodsky’s statement that “the four-component knot in Seminar 23 opens up the path to thinking generalized foreclosure and the kinship between contemporary symptoms and ordinary psychosis” directs us beyond the classical approach to neurosis, in accordance with the notion of the generalization of the concept of psychosis.

It was from this perspective that, to take up the title of the Xith Congress of the WAP, the focus is placed on the signifier “others,” the other “psychoses,” beyond the ordinary and extraordinary psychoses.

The new symptoms demonstrate that there are diverse ways of sustaining “the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life” in the neuroses, even on the basis of phallic rupture. “It is possible to say that phallic rupture stems from the very logic of the functioning of jouissance. For reasons that refer to the contingent impact of the signifier on the body, the jouissance that accords with the inexistence of the sexual relation is forbidden to the subject.”
What we encounter today as versions of the father can no longer be easily classified into groupings that would have been constituted in other times: drug addicts, anorexics, etc. These versions proliferate and in the sexual realm they denounce the difficulty of establishing a new order. There is always an attempt to complement the Name of the Father which, as predicate, cannot correspond to the mode of jouissance that is singular to each subject.

It is thus necessary to investigate, in the realm of the sexual life, the forms of madness that present as arrangements on the basis of phallic rupture, which are distinct from those that present as “a disturbance at the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life.”12 Here we include the clinic with children and adolescents.

Ernesto Sinatra13, evoking “the very late Lacan”, highlights that it is necessary “to free oneself from the residues inherited from the discourse of the Other”14. This helps us to conduct the cases that are on the axis of phallic rupture, given that this is the recommended way to proceed with neurosis. He stresses, however, that if in the end the Other does not exist, it is only with the counterpart, the neighbor, the little other, that we can re-establish the locus and the link, which puts us on the same path of treatment for psychosis as that indicated by Lacan at the beginning of his teaching.

Whatever might be the madness that is presented, the place of the psychoanalyst is reaffirmed, for it includes the real in the approach to the arrangement found by each analysand in order to deal with an invasive jouissance. As Miller tells us: “The discourse of the patient is woven around the real.”15

Translated by Felipe Bier Nogueira

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1 TN: All quotes are free translations from their respective Brazilian or Argentinian editions.
4 Ibid., p. 54.
7 Miller J.-A., Ordinary Psychosis Revisited, op. cit., p. 44.
8 Ibid.
10 Brodsky G., Locuras Discretas..., op. cit., p. 81
11 Santiago J., op. cit.
13 Sinatra E., Preparatory activity towards VIII ENAPOL in São Paulo, on 08/03/2017.
The Discrete Signs of Ordinary Psychosis: A Way of Writing the Real

Clara M. Holguín – NEL

The syntagm “ordinary psychosis” introduces psychosis from the perspective of the ordinary, as something that surpasses the extraordinary and resembles neurosis, despite not having its stability. Between the two, neurosis and psychosis, a whole array of clinical finesse opens out. What is the novelty introduced by the term ordinary? “What we are looking for in ordinary psychosis is what Lacan calls a disturbance that occurs at the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life”. A disturbance of jouissance that is produced in the encounter between the signifier and the body, provoking a jouissance of which the subject knows nothing but experiences as something that does not fit or conform. It is a jouissance without meaning that belongs to the level of writing or the letter. It is the Ariadne’s thread that serves to guide us to the discreet sign as index of the ordinary.

The letter… discreet sign

The letter is not an impression, but rather a cut in the real. It is a mark, a littoral between jouissance and knowledge which writes the unrepresented, letter-litter, pure remainder, object and waste. Something was trapped and cannot be said in common language. It is a sign that represents something for someone. Just like the purloined letter, the sign behaves discreetly. It is not evident, often confused with ordinary appearance in order to make-believe.

Spare parts that show up as indications, cuttings or outlines; superfluous or excessive details, tonalities and intensities; the more and the less, perceived in a continuity in which it is possible to read the modes of jouissance. The sign linked to the discrete interrogates the discontinuous and introduces the continuous. Contrary to classification, this is the threshold of clinical equality between parlêtres – everyone is mad – a manifestation of what Freud called the sentiment of life, in order to account for a treatment of jouissance outside of all dialectic, where there is no triggering, unhooking, or even quilting point. It is a clinic of invention that teaches how to do without the Name of the Father on condition of making use of it.
Rather than localizing what is deficient in relation to a supposed norm, it is a question of “an attempt to grasp and encompass the subtle and moving way in which each subject, in his singularity, manages, or does not manage, to knot and link the real of the sexual non-rapport with the body (the imaginary) and with the signifier (the symbolic)”. The “Borromean” is the writing that permits the articulation of modes of jouissance that are partial and consistent by way of the imbrications, knotting, consistencies and inconsistencies of the registers RSI.

There where the body is not captured by phallic meaning and delusion does not constitute a solution, ordinary psychosis takes support in belief as radical. It involves “a sort of make-believe of the Name of the Father, that is to say, a compensatory make believe (CMB), which can take the form of “naming to”. It is a new use of the Name of the Father.

These little clues that appear under transference – micro discontinuities – organized on the basis of a triple externality, are not easy to elucidate. As a result of the fall of the traditional discourses they become mixed up with generalized resources as apparently normal solutions, requiring that we distinguish the sign of the solutions that are also called discreet.

Attention should be paid to the colour, the intensity or the tonality of the phenomena of the body or of language, as well as those that are produced at the level of signification (ineffable intention), which show a displacement of the axis of clinical classification towards the multiple (multiplication and plurality), the ordinary (banal and common) and the varieties of jouissance (not-all).

As an example, a clinical panorama that is without any claim to be exhaustive permits us to localize the signs in the registers I-S-R:

In the imaginary register, we find the use of the image at the level of the body and of the mental.

In the first case, both dual identifications, i(a), and the use of certain artificial means serve to appropriate and circumscribe the body. Tattoos and piercings as well as corporeal and artistic practices (performance or sport) contribute to inscribing the subject in the commonly admitted discourse. As far as the mental image is concerned we find effects of meaning under the guise of an elaboration of knowledge or, on the contrary, in the difficulties of acceding to knowledge.

In the symbolic register there appear a series of phenomena that describe ways in which a subject can make a name for themselves by means of an S. Transforming a common name into a proper name or making oneself a name by means of a social function, res-
ponsibility or specific task. These are semblants that allow a symbolic pertinence to be assured.

In the register of the real we can situate diverse forms of identification with the object a. Identification with partial objects, such as the voice and gaze and those objects that come to occupy their place, as well as the identification with the waste-object. Forms of passage to the act (marginalization, delinquency, early maternity); addictions (drifting, uprooted lives without precise points of reference). In the same way we can situate experiences of jouissance that appear as something foreign that is imposed with a sensation of horror and perplexity: corporal dispersion when coming into contact with another body or with imposed forms of jouissance.12

This is a panorama of the localization of the signs of foreclosure, writings of the real that allow us to treat the hole, explore the fissure and situate traces of jouissance.

Translated by Alejandro Betancur

3 Velásquez J. F, “Nuevas formas de psicosis”, Available at http://nel-medellin.org/las-nuevas-formas-de-las-psicosis/
12 Velásquez J.F., “Nuevas formas de psicosis”, op. cit.